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in A. Perulli, T. Treu, Enterprise and social rights, Kluwer, 2027, p. 271 ss.

Divergent national patterns and European harmonization

The German model and its foundations Summary: The paper discusses the different forms of workers' participation in the firm in European countries.

1. Divergent national patterns and European  harmonization 

 

The concept and the practice of workers participation  in the enterprise have a long  and controversial history  in the European countries.  Indeed  the basic ideas and ideologies  have been  a matter  of discussion   and of  bitter  controversies within  the labor  movement  throughtout  the  XX Century. These controversies  reflect  the different  position  of the labor  movement  and of the (labour  friendly)  political  parties on the role of workers  and of trade unions in  democratic  countries. 

Different unions  and political  strategies have shaped all  the relations  between  the labor movement  and  the economic  and social institutions of the European  countries.  The divergence among the various strategies  has been  most acute  on the role  of workers and unions vis a vis  the central economic institution  of our societies, namely the firm  in its various forms, and has  influenced the major traits of the national  systems  of labor management  relations.  

The role  of workers  and of unions  representatives within the firms,  in particular  the forms and the  possibility  of their  participation  to enterprise decision-making,  have been  considered  a significant  element which  characterizes  the social model  and indeed  the different types  of (national) capitalism. 

The difference between  the various European system, and  their collectives actors, is well  represented  in the  long dispute, which lasted  for over  two decades,  concerning  the European  directives  aimed  at  promoting  different  forms of workers  participation in the enterprise.  

The directives  approved between  1985 and 2009  on this issue  represent  the major  attempt of the  European  institution   to intervene directly in labor  management relations; and are an exception  to the mainly  abstensionistic attitude of the European Union in this area. 

This intensive  regulatory action  confirms  the importance  attributed  by the EU to the  internal dynamics of the  firms  and to the   promotion  of collaboratory labor relations   as essential   components of  the European  social model. More specifically it is assumed that  collaborative  industrial relations at firm level  are conducive  to both  social peace and  economic  efficiency. Moreover  the promotion  of social  peace  and collaboration within the firms  is considered  to  contribute positively  to radiate  similar  participatory  attitudes  and strategies to the entire system  of industrial  relations  and  hence  to reinforce  social  cohesion  and economic  stability. 

These reasons  asserted by the  European  institutions during the preparation  of the directives,  were influenced by the most  prominent  model  of workers participation at firm  level,  namely  the German  codetermination.  But  precisely  on this point  the European  strategy  had  to face  quite  different  positions  not only  of most  national employers association, which are traditionally  opposed or skeptical   to all kind of workers participation,  but also  the reluctance   of many  national  labor unions to adopt  the German model  of participation.  The resistance was common to those unions  which were not  opposed in  principle  to workers  participation,  like the non communist  unions of Italy, France, Spain and even UK. 

This  opposition was consistent  with  the practices  of labor management relations  prevailing  in these countries. Their national  unions,  which  traditionally  regarded  collective  bargaining  as the primary  way to  govern labor management  in general  and   at  firm level, attributed  to collective  agreements, and not to the law,  the decision to set up and to  regulate workers information  and participation, and shared  different  positions on  the  content  and on the forms of these rights. 


2. The continuum  of workers participation: from  information to board- level representation

The different forms of participation adopted  in the national systems  can be placed along a continuum, ranging   from  the right of workers and of their  representatives  to be informed about the major decisions of the enterprise, to that  of beeing  consulted on the  same issues  prior to  employers decisions, to the various forms of “institutional” participation,   including  the presence  of workers  representatives  in the governing bodies  of the company. The definition of these participatory rights  as a  continuum indicates  that  they  share common  elements  and differ  for the  modes  and  the intensity  of  their influence  on enterprise decision making.

But the two  poles  of the continuum  represent  different  policy and ideological  approaches of the unions  vis a vis the firm, a divergence linked to the general  positions of the labor  movement  in industrial  relations  and in society. At one  extreme the basic concept is that the  unions and the forms of workers  participation have to be  remain external  to the firm, and the influence  on firms decisions  can be exerted through  the various forms of  collective  action,  including strike.

 This position  excludes  the presence  of employees representatives not only  in the  decision  making  process of the enterprise,  but in principle  also  in bilateral institutions set up within  the enterprise with the task of determining working  conditions  in conjunction  with management. 

 A similar  approach has  inspired  the general  attitude of  the these Unions  towards  the private enterprise and indeed  towards the functioning of the  economy. Unions actions and collective  bargaining  had  to be  concerned  exclusively  with  the representation  and protection  of workers  interests  mainly  in the  distribution of income,  with no concern with  the organization, the strategies and even the success  of the firm. 

These  positions have    deep roots in the  political  and labor  union history  of these  countries. They are favoured by a system  of industrial  relations characterized by high level  of political  and ideological conflict  and class consciousness   of the labor movement, by  the existence  of strong  leftwing  parties, particularly the communist, and by the traditional  weakness  of organized  labor  which  has kept it away  from the enterprise,  and excluded  the possibility  of influencing  from within the  managerial decision  making  process. 

 Similar “antagonistic” orientations were not confined  to the  most militant labor unions, but    reflected  the  widely shared  opinion that  growth was a self-sustaining mechanism, in  a linear direction of development. This  opinion  implied  that  labor  law and at social policies  in most countries, had  the exclusive  objective  to protect workers in their employment conditions.

 The profound transformations  intervened in the last decades with the recurrent economic crisis  and instability, have altered the very basis on which these assumptions were founded. These transformations have challenged the economic  actors to change  attitude and forced them to   share  the concern for the conditions of production  and for the dynamics of the firms. For much the same  reasons labor law is required  to change its approach with  respect  to  the economic  conditions of growth. We will return  of this point. 


3. The German model and its foundations

The other extreme  of the continuum   is represented  by the  “institutional” or organic   forms of workers participation,   in which  workers representatives  are present  in the governing  bodies  of the firms, more  precisely of their  legal expression, the corporation. Here too the  development  of these forms of institutional  participation is rooted in the history  of the  political and industrial relations  systems.  These systems, which  are  mainly  concentrated  in central  and northern European countries, are  characterized by a strong, united and politically integrated union movement, by a stable  social and political  structure  of the country, by a  civic attitude and ethos inclined to sustain social  cohesion. All these elements are conducive to develop and  to make acceptable  non adversarial  labor management relations. More specifically  they are reinforced by a widely shared concept of the firm as an organic entity  or as a community (gemeinschaft), which  corresponds to the  common feeling  of the people and has been dominant  also among the legal scholars. In fact  this  communitarian  concept of the firm is most congenial for   hosting some  institutional or organic forms of participation of workers who are  a decisive component of the enterprise community.

These favourable  conditions have not  removed  all the  obstacles to  the introduction of the various forms of institutional participation in those countries. The difficulties  are shown in  the  first experiments and in the subsequent events of the Weimar Republic,  and after the second world  by the introduction  of Mitbestimmung in Germany by decree of the allied forces occupying the country.

These forms of workers  participation have been introduced  in the governance structure  of the  companies  as existing  at the time, without questioning its form and legitimacy. This decision,  appears to be consistent  with  the idea of the firm as “Gemeinschaft”, in so far as the workers representatives  are an  integral  part of the  community  as it is.  In fact  this  assumption  has not  been challenged in the subsequent experience  of the  Mitbestimmung. As we shall see it will have to   be reexamined  in view of the transformations of the companies structure in the postfordist era.

One further  element must be mentioned in order to qualify the forms of institutional participation adopted in central European countries: namely the presence of workers rappresentative elected in the units of the firm having codetermination rights in a series of important enterprise decisions.  These powers of codetermination legally recognized are an essential part of the participatory  model of German companies. They do not alter the hierarchical structure of firms but they shape their decision processes not by periodical  pressures  like in collective  bargaining  but by their  presence and daily intervention  in the work organization and practices. 


4. European harmonization of a minimum common denominator

The various  system of participation have developed in the European countries  according to the national traditions and responding  to the  strategies  of the  national actors:  the social parties, the governments  and the  relevant public institutions.

 For this reason  the original  purpose of the  European authorities  to harmonize the national models of participation  has  met with strong  obstacles. In fact  the European  Commission has promoted successifully the harmonization only of those forms of participation which were present  and accepted  in most  European  countries: first of all information and consultation,  subsequently the  European Works Councils (EWC), which are mainly  instrumental to the practice of information  and consultation rights. 

The EU directives  on these issues have managed to  harmonize  some common  traits of national  practices,  i. e. adopting and extending a sort of  minimum common  denominator. This result  and these limits  of the European  harmonization are indeed common to  other areas of European  social law. 

The unions  and  the EWCs  have been granted the rights  to previous  information  and consultation on the major  firms initiatives and policies, but not the rights to  codetermination, which  have  the most  direct influence on the decision making  process of the firms. The EU  promotion  of the rights  of information  and consultation  had a direct impact  in these countries whose  national practices had never experienced statutory regulation of the matter. In other  countries, like Italy, where information and consultation rights were recognized  by many national agreements, the European directives 94/45 and  2002/14  contributed to consolidate  and to  extend the existing practices. An important  impact  of these directives is that they have  contributed  to spread  these practices  among small and medium size firms which usually  were not reached by  collective agreements. 

The scope of directive 2002/149 covers all European firms employing more than 50 employees in one member  country; which  means  a coverage  of 3%  of  firms  and of 50% of the employees. Lower  limits are sometime indicated  in national  systems, following  the impulse of legislation and of  unions  pressure.  

The impact  of these directives on the actual  practice of  information and consultation has been uneven,  depending  not so much on  the legal transposition  of the European norms in the  national  legislations, but  on trade  unions  influence  in the workplaces  and on the  general conditions  of national  industrial  relations.

The European  directive 94/45 (revised by directive 2009/38) has been rather effective in promoting the diffusion  of EWCS among firms operating in different European states. According to recent estimates   EWCs  have  been set up in 1071 firms  and groups of enterprises, amounting  to a considerable   percentage  of the large companies  operating  in Europe  (employing  over 17 million  workers).  These  representative bodies  have  contributed  to improve  the effectiveness of information and consultation practices with  regard  to transnational issues. 

Moreover  the EWC have  developed  their  functions often beyond  the area  indicated  by the directive, because they tend the use  their rights to information and consultation in order to behave  informally as bargaining agents, making the most of their  acquised  knowledge of firms decisions and strategies. 

As mentioned  already  the directives on EWCs  and information and consultation rights  have promoted  the type  of participation more in line  with  the tradition  of Industrial Relation  of many European  countries,  and less resisted  by  both the unions  and the employers associations  precisely  because  these rights are asserted from “outside” the firm. However the diffusion of information  and consultation rights and of the  representative bodies excercising  these rights has contributed considerably to introduce  participatory  patterns  in European  labor management relations,  and to influence in  the same  direction  the practices  of collective bargaining.

 The collective rights of informations and consultation recognized   by  the directives concern  the  firms decisions  not only on work  organization and on the conditions of work,  but  also on the employment trends and on the major decisions and development  plans impinging   on employment and working conditions. The periodic exchange  of information and  of opinions  between  the parties  on these issues  has provided workers  representatives  with a systematic knowledge of the enterprise functioning   and strategies,   which is  absent  or even excluded  in adversarial  collective bargaining. 

The norms of the  directive  provide  that information  and consultation  must  intervene  in due time, i.e.  since the initial  formation  of enterprise decisions,   so to allow an effective  dialogue between the parties and  an influence on  the final decisions of the firm: then norms  are    an explicit  indication  that these firms decisions must  take  into account the collective voice of the employees.  The other  provision of the directives whereby   the rights to  information and consultation must   be exercised  vis a vis “the  appropriate  level  of the enterprise decision making   process”, gives  the workers  representative an  unprecedented  opportunity  to look  into the  structure of the  enterprises and to verify  the relevant  centers  of decision even  beyond  the “legal veils” of the  different  companies which are part of the  group.  

The diffusion  and the  acceptance  of the  rights  of information  and consultation  mark a  substantial  distance  from  the positions  traditionally  followed  by some  national  unions  which  excluded any  involvement  in the enterprise. These rights, although asserted “from outside” may be quite influencial  on  enterprise behaviour.

This argument may be used and in fact  is often advanced, to confirm the view that  the various forms of participation  should be  analyzed  on a continuum  and judged for  their  effective  incidence  on firms  decisions more than   for their  legal form. 


4. The compromise  solution of the SE

The different  positions  of the actors of the national industrial   relations systems  are reflected  in the long  discussions  which have brought to   the approval  of the European  company statute  in 2001 (directive  2001/86 and regulation 2157/2001).  The final approval  was based  on a compromise  among the different  positions which  had  blocked the  decision for years.   The initial  proposal  to  adopt the German  system  of  board  level  employees   representation as the  only model  for the  SE,  was abandoned.  Instead  the European company was  shaped  as to allow other forms of employees  participation  practiced  in the European countries: not only the presence  of employees representatives  in the  governing bodies of the companies (board of directors; supervisory board),  but also   the election  of workers  representatives in a special  body,  distinct  from  those organs  and enabled to exercise the rights  to information and consultation.

The option between  these different models  was left in first instance  to the parties  negotiating  the adoption  of the SE (special negotiating  body), according  to the  subsidiarity  principle  followed  in other  areas  of European social policies. Lacking  any agreement among the parties  the directive indicates  as subsidiary requirements two  possible solutions:  the adoption  of a form  of organic    participation  if preexisting   in the companies  present in the SE  or of a representative body  distinct from the organs of the  enterprise.  This  provision, based  on the  before/after  principle  implies  that  the rights of participation acquired  in the  original  company  are the basis for  the same  rights in the SE. More specifically it is  intended to avoid  that the adoption  of the SE might reduce the  rights of the employees  of the countries  where the institutional  participation  of workers  in the companies was  previously  established.

The plurality  of forms  allowed  by  the  directive and the  conservation  of previous  employees    rights   indicates  the impossibility  to fully harmonize the different  systems present  in  the European  countries. In particular it confirms the reluctance of  the social parties  of many  countries, although for different  reasons,  to break with their national  traditions  and to accept a direct  involvement  in the governance structure  of the firms. 

On the other hand  the directive  recognizes  to the  representative  bodies  of the workers  in the SE  the same  rights to information, consultation and participation which  are granted  to the trade  unions and to the EWCs by the  directives 2002/149  and 2009/38. 

This latter solution   can hardly by considered  equivalent  to  the organic   participation  typical of the German model,  because  the  presence of workers participation within the boards of the firm allows for a more stable  and   more significant  exchange of information  and of opinions between  the  boards and workers representatives.   It may also  facilitate greater workers  influence  on the decisions of the bodies where their  representatives  are present:   the board  of directors (vorstand) or the supervisory board (aufsichtrat). 


5. Factors affecting the effectiveness  of participation

In any case  however the influence of workers  representatives on company’s  decisions  is limited  because  they are in a minority  position within the boards,  and even  in the  most advanced  form of participation they  can never  determine  the final decision of the board  (see M. Weiss, in this volume). 

The effective  influence  may depend on factors  others than  the legal  composition  of the boards, namely on the capacity  of workers representatives to support  their view with the authority  derived from the pressure  of their  constituencies  and possibly  on the ability  to establish alliances with other stakeholders,  internal and external  to the firm. Moreover the structure of the  decision -making  process and the distribution of competences  among  the various  organs of the firm, even beyond  the legal provisions, is relevant in determining the real impact of workers participation  on the company strategy and organization.

The effectiveness of workers  representation  is also  linked  to the specific   objects of firm decisions. The practice  of participation  indicates  that  workers   representatives  in the boards  (and also the Work Directors provided by the German legislation of 1976 and 1951)  usually concentrate their  attention on those decisions which are directly relevant  to working conditions. This  represent a sort  of tacit division of labor with the representatives of management which correspond to  the skills and the traditional  roles of workers  and of  managers  in any  type of company.  Given this   division of labor, the  position  of workers representatives  in the institutional  participation  may  resemble  to that  of unions representatives and of the EWCs in  a well functioning system of information and consultation in participatory bargaining. 

Moreover informal arrangements are  often adopted by companies in order to specify or to circumvent formal procedures,  and to change the functions of the organs where workers representatives are present,  with the  effect  of reducing their voice and influence.  Indeed,  as indicated  by  M. Weiss with  reference  to the  Germany  model,  the actual  value of institutional participation  can be  fully  appreciated  only by taking  into account  the   entire   system  of labor  management   relations;  particularly  the presence  of two levels of workers  representation  closely  interrelated,  where  the workers representation in the supervisory  board is a sort of extended  arm of  the works councils.  Most   employees representatives  in the board  are usually also works council members and  this link  has strengthened both  those instruments of participation. It has  promoted communication through  informal  channels, between workers  representatives and their constituencies  contributing  to build mutual trust  and  an organizational  culture based  on long  lasting  consultation  practices.  The success  of the German model  is grounded  on these  factors, and even more profoundly in common social values, including the idea  of the firm a community: all elements which are not easily transferable in other national systems. 

The impact of directive 86/2001 on the harmonization  of participatory practices  in Europe  has been  rather limited.  The number  of SE has  increased  to around 600,  but mainly  in the countries of central Europe  where large  companies had already adopted  forms  of organic  participation  and wanted to maintain  them in the new European  format.

In the other  European  countries the parties  have continued  to practice the forms of participation  traditionally  prevailing, and have  avoided  to adopt  the SE  even  in the minimal  version (subsidiary requirements)   endorsed  by the directive in case of non agreement  among the negotiating parties which does not  innovate  the traditional  practices of information and consultation.

 The practice of these countries  confirms the  reluctance  of both  social  parties, (although for different  reasons)  to cross the “borders” of the company structure of governance. The unions are still opposed to be involved  in the internal functioning  of the enterprise, because they consider it an alien if not an hostile ground. The employers  prefer  to keep workers representatives  off this ground; indeed in the case of SME they tend to  exclude the very presence of these representatives.  


6. The impact of the recent transformations of work and of firms structure on workers participation

The great transformations occurred in recent years in the economic and social conditions of the world  and in the structure  of firms have exposed to new challenges all the components of industrial relations systems including  the forms and practices of participation. 

An extensive    body of research has  analyzed  the economic and social  changes which  have  altered the  traditional traits of Industrial relations and the power  relations between  the actors to the detriment  of the  labor movement. The impact of the  new forms of organization  of the firms, national  and multinational, has  also been analyzed, but not yet fully explored.

 The diversity  and the increased volatility of the types of work induced  by the new technologies, the  competitive pressures, and the  deregulation  of markets  have   contributed to  a general  weakening of the labor movement, eroding the very basis  of their representativeness  and of  collective action. These factors have a negative impact  particularly  on workers  representative bodies  in the workplace  which are essential  actors of collective  action and are directly exposed to the pressure of these factors. The diversity of the new workforce has  reduced its social  cohesion and contributed to create  favourable conditions for the  individualization  of labor management  relations. It has reduced the appeal   of  all forms of collective  action for  the new workers and  at the same  time  has made room for an  innovative  management  to establish  direct relations with  the individual  employees and/or groups of them with the aim of promoting  their involvement in the enterprise. 

The term  “involvement”  has  multiple connotations,  but in these  cases it implies  that the  participation  of employees is shaped individually on management terms  and is determined  by management more strictly than those forms of participation  based on collective  or legal  regulations.


7. Management- led forms of employees involvement

 The  forms  and objects of these  managerial initiatives are different. But they share a common character, that of being mostly concerned  with  the organization of work  in the  productive  units,  or even  below, in the  shop floor.

 The involvement of employees as individuals and in team works, which are often being used particularly in the  sectors  of intelligent  manufacturing,  has proved to be an effective  instrument for promoting  innovations and productivity. Participatory teams  are highly valued  by management  because  they allow to  make   the most  of  the experience and of the knowledge  of the employees acquired  in the daily  life  of the plants.   

 Recent  research, concerned mainly  with  Italian cases,  shows  ambivalent  implications of this type of involvement for labor management and industrial relation. It confirms that employees involvement  in participatory  teams  is gaining ground among  high performance firms where it contributes to the firms success  and to the well being of the  people involved.    The  initiation  and the contents  of these  experiments are  always in the hands of management. But their objective  is not necessary anti union, as it has  been historically  in many  countries  (US in the first place). Most often  management  initiatives seem to develop outside  union channels, without any formal unions  intervention, particularly in the countries where they have  no legal  power to intervene in work organization.  Union representatives  particularly  at plant level  have been  involved  and contributed to  their success in specific  cases  where the practice  of collaborative  labor relations was already established. 

The success of these  experiments  confirms their  importance  for the quality  of future  labor management relations.  The labor unions are called  to  respond to this new challenge  on  penalty  of leaving to management  an important  ground  of action  which  may  enrich  the value  of participation,   particularly for employees  who are  not reached  by traditional collective activities. 

It is up  to the  unions  to place these forms  of “micro participation” in the wider  context  of labor management relations, so that  the scope and influence  of  collective  participation  may  be extended  to all  business activities  and strategies,  as  it has been  in the most valuable national  traditions.


8. Specialized and financial  forms of workers participation 

European  firms  have  experienced  in many countries other forms of employees participation. A widely diffused type is represented by specialized  representative  bodies, often  bilateral,  dealing  with matters of common  interest  of the  parties directly  influencial  on the quality of work.

The majors areas  of interest are  professional  training, health and safety at work and welfare benefits. The EU has not  provided  any general  model of specialized  workers representation.  

Health and safety  at work has been an area  of extensive regulation by the European authorities. The council   directive  of June 12, 1989 recognizes  the rights of employees and /or of their  representatives  to be consulted  and to take part  in all issues relating  to health  and safety  at work. A similar  right  is sanctioned  by many  national  legislations  which regulate also  various  forms  of specialized  committees competent  in these matters.  

It is also worth noting that the European  Union  has recognized the opportunity to adopt various  forms of workers participation to  the economic results of the firm,  in two directions: by promoting   various kinds of bonuses and profit sharing and  by favouring with fiscal incentives  the distribution of shares among  employees and  employees stock ownership  plans (ESOP).  

These types of participation have  in common  with other forms character  that they may  contribute  to promote  employees  involvement  within the enterprise, but they differ from the mainstream approach of workers  participation for their sectorial or micro objects  which reduces or exclude their  impact  on the  overall balance of   labor management relations. 

For this reason they have usually attracted scarce interest  or met with  resistance  from the labor movement; and in  many cases  have been  promoted  by managerial  initiatives.  On the other  hand  they  have acquired greater importance also for the labor movement when, like  in the field of health  and safety  and of professional   training, they  have been endorsed  by legislation  or when  some forms of financial participation such as profit sharing  and stock ownership  have not remained a simply way  of  remunerating the work,  but have implied  some participation of workers to the  governance of the  firm. This has  been the case  e.g.   in some Italian and French  state controlled enterprises.  


9. Acceptance and innovation  of workers participation:  the impact  of the individualization of employment relations 

The  forms  of workers  participation analyzed so far  have  come to be  widely, if not  unanimously, accepted  in many European countries.  But  their  long experience  does not rescue  them from  the challenges deriving from the new environment  in which they must operate, which is so different from that of their origins. On the contrary  this acceptance might  favour inertia or even prize conservation over innovation. 

 The major challenges to employees participation come from two factors, which are affecting all aspects of social and economic life: the diversity  and  the individualization of the working population;  the changing  structure and organization  of the firms.

As I have already mentioned, the former trend poses  a major  threat to the very basis on which industrial  relations and labor law have been built. How to relaunch the spirit and the strategies of collective action  is an open  question  decisive  for the future  of the  labor movement. The diffusion of workers participation at the enterprise  and workshop  level,  may contribute to revitalizing the unions initiatives. This  contribution  may be  more significant than that of  adversarial collective  bargaining which in the present  contest of economic turmoil  may be less attractive to the  new labor force and possibly detrimental  to the pursuance of common obiectives of economic growth. 

The importance of micro participation  can increase if the legislator,  as it has done in Germany will  reinforce the  presence  of workers representative  providing them with  significant and even binding powers on the  major issues of work organization. It remains  to be seen  if and  under which conditions workers participation  may keep this positive influence  when  it has to deal not with  micro  issues but with  the general strategies  of the firms and  even  more so with  the  directions and quality  of economic  growth; because  these issues  are less easily perceivable by the individualized  constituencies  of the unions.  

The second major trend of our time, i.e. the new forms of organization and of governance of  the firm,  have wide ranging  implications on our social and economic systems  and specifically on labor management  relations. These  implications are only partially explored  by the actors  of labor relations; because both  the theoretical  analysis  and the pratical consequences of the  transformation  of the firm  (and of its legal form  the corporation)  have  been for a long time neglected. Their impact  has  not been fully explored  not only  by unions representatives, but also  by scholars, due to  the traditional  separation  between the  approach of labor   lawyers and of  business  lawyers. The same  separation  is present  in the two  European legal sources,   which  have regulated  the matter:   a  regulation  on the statute  of SE  and a  directive  on workers participation in the SE.  More specific research should be directed to analyze carefully,  also  on the basis  of the  existing  practices, particularly these issues:  how the functions and the  structure  of the  various  governing   bodies  of the firm influence  the behavior of the workers  representatives, the  interaction  of these  representatives with their constituency and with the  representatives  of management  and of property;  the distribution  of roles,  formal  and informal, in respect to the different firm activities. 


10. The impact  of changing  enterprise structures: group enterprises and “network contracts”   

This neglect seems to be a residual manifestation  of the traditional  idea that the firm is not a matter of  concern for the labor movement, but  an entity to be taken as given and possibly to be changed by external action pressure. 

Indeed one aspect of the enterprise transformation,  namely the group  of enterprises,  has  attacted  more attention  than others by the legal  doctrine  and also by  many national  legislators. The aim has been mainly that of extending  the area of  labor law  protections to the whole  perimeter of the enterprise  group  and vis a vis the group itself. These attempts of the legal  doctrine  and of the national judges  have not  always been  successful to break  the “corporate  veil”  and to identify the group  as an entity  responsible  for labor law obligations. The identity and the responsibility of the enterprise group have been affirmed on various ground  only for specific issues, including the exercise of workers   rights of information, consultation and participation. 

 The European Union has pursued since the 80ies the objective  of “forcing” the center of decision  of the enterprise group with the aim of providing workers representatives with the  relevant information concerning the whole group; in the Vredeling proposal even when this center of decision was located  outside the European community.  

Directives 2002/4 and 2009/38 confirm the same purpose by providing that the rights of workers  representatives to  consultation and information, must be exercised vis a vis the appropriate  level of decision making.  The EWC directive (art. 3)  has also given  an extensive  definition of  the   controlling  undertaking, in order  to establish the body responsible for many duties  of informations  and consultation. 

 Similarly the norms on the institutional forms of participation take into account the specific  character of the enterprise group,  usually by providing that workers  representatives must be present in the boards of the dominant  firm  of the group. The national and European  regulation  seem  to indicate that the law is inclined to take into account the real power relations within the companies  and the groups even beyond their legal structure. This factual approach is more easily  followed here than in traditional  employment regulation. 

Such an approach  seems in line with the need that  these collective rights  be measured precisely on their capacity to influence  the power  relations among the social parties. Complex problems of interpretation remain to be solved, particularly in order to identify the boundaries  of the group of enterprises  and the real center  of decisions  among  different legal entities. In fact the conclusion  reached on this question by national and European  courts are far  from  convergent.  

Moreover the criteria  adopted  to solve this problem  with  respect  to enterprise  groups are not  easily applicable to other forms  of  aggregation  between firms,  like the so called “network contracts” where  no dominant  center of power  is identifiable because the units of the network are linked  by contractual relations established through consensus among peers. The practice of network contracts,  is becoming less an exception,  indeed quite common, as modern firms  move away from the hierarchical structure of governance developed  in the  fordist model of production. 

In fact the transformations of  modern business enterprise  have general implications for the legal theories of the firm and have spurred  the legal  doctrine to reconceptualize the economic theorization of corporate law and of corporate governance.



11. Participation in the “fluid  enterprise”  

 The revision  is underway  with  interesting  but still  uncertain  results,  some of which are presented   in this  volume. 

Contributions  to this  debate are coming from the field  of  legal theory  and of corporation law more than from  labor lawyers  for the reasons indicated  above.  For the  same reason  the law and  the practice of industrial  relations  have been predominantly  interested  in the firm as productive  unit and have discregarded  the importance  of its governance structure. But the new configuration  of the  network firm  and  the theories  which  represent the enterprise  as  a  more or less defined    combination  of contracts, have  major  consequences  on  both  collective  and  individual  employment relations because they   blur the identity  of the subject employer  who is the necessary  counterpart of the employees  in  individual and collective  relations. The new  character of  the firm  as a “fluide sequence” of contract may require criteria for the identification of the employer  different from  those  developed by traditional labor law. 

The new criteria  for this  identification  may be  based  on the major functions  which  underpins the notion  of employer. It  has   been argued that  the  transformation  of the firm’s  structure and organization  may modify  and even  abolish the  traditional  subjects, but  not the major functions and roles of business enterprises.   In the specific  case of “networks contracts”  involving  multiple  units and  firms, the definition  of the various  functions will  depend  in the first  place  on the contract  which  defines the powers and  responsabilities of the parties, including  those  concerning employment  relations.  But the conditions  for  establishing  these responsabilities  will follow  in principle  the general rules  of civil law.  To avoid abuses the various types of  responsibility   will  be attributed  to the subjects who have exercised  the  functions  of employer  even beyond the wording of the contract. 

These  mutations  of the  firm  structure have  different  implications  on the forms  of workers  participation. Board level  participation  has been based  on the  pattern  of the large fordist  corporation  and on the notion  of the enterprise as community. This form of participation may  continue  to operate as long  as this type of enterprise exists. Its factual   influence on labor management relations  will depend on the importance  that  large corporations continue to have in the future systems of production.  The various forms of sub contracting, outsourcing and fragmentation of productive  activities will tend to reduce the scope of this type of participation. In any event  workers institutional  participation  might have to adopt new instruments in order to  function  within  the host corporation,  which  itself will be influenced  by the changed  economic   and social scenario. For this reason  the existing patterns  of governance  where workers representatives  are elected  cannot any  long taken  for granted  as it has been so far. The very legal  notion of  establishement and of employees relevant to the application of workers participation might have to be redefined in view of the changing forms of organization of work and of the enterprise. 

Other  patterns  of participatory  rights  - mainly information and consultation -  which  have  developed  in Europe  are less dependent  on the  structure  of the  enterprise. But even  these rights have been mainly  exercised  - like most  other collective rights – vis a vis  the large enterprises and group enterprises assuming  their existing  governance  and centers of decision.

 The  emergence  of network firms and of multifunctional employers will require  profound adaptation  also of these forms of participation  if  they want  to maintain economic  and  social   effectiveness. In these cases the risk  for workers representatives  is to  run after  the multiple  functions of the firm,   as it happens with the micro forms of participation mentioned above,   and to be  captured  by the interests of management or at best to reflect the “partial rationalities” of the specific functions. 

How to restore  some unity of purpose  among the various    fragments of participation and finalize them,  is  an open question  which  must be  faced  with  innovative  answers by  the collective  actors in the first place and  possibly  by the legislator. A useful contribution  could be to  reinforce  by law  the powers  of workers  representatives   at  shop- floor level, which remains a decisive  area of influence also  in the new contest  of multifunctional firms.

A second important  condition is  to strenghten the organizational  and political  links between shop  floor representatives  and  the other levels of unions organization present in  the enterprise  and beyond. This condition must  be fulfilled by the labor movement itself   and presupposes a search for unity beyond the  boundaries of the individual  firm. The pursuance of a   unitary collective voice is the most important  answer  that  the labor unions can oppose to the fragmentation of the employer. Indeed this  is a  general challenge facing  the  labor movement in the  advanced  economies;  which  implies not only a revision of strategies by the labor movement itself but also  a reconsideration of the role of the law vis a vis the firm’s governance.

This issue  can only  be mentioned here  because  it has  to be  framed  in the  much  broarder perspective  of the  horizontal effects of fundamental rights and of the scope  of   “constitutionalism beyond  the state”.  The implications  of this “societal  constitutionalism”  on the new forms of firms governance should be explored following  the suggestions of the authors who stress  the importance  of “capillary constitutions” to counteract  the “totalization  tendencies or the partial rationalites  of  the social subsystems” and of the multiple  centers of powers present  in our society.   It has  to be remembered  that the various forms of workers participation were  among the  forerunners of this  idea of societal constitutionalism. Giving  new instruments and  strategies  to workers  participation  in the  enterprise  will  contribute  to the  expansion  of constitutionalism  in a critical  area of social  relations. 

The impulse  in this  direction  may come  from an  interplay  of two process: of   legal interventions and of the  influence  of social  structures. The law can contribute to  strenghten  the autonomy  and the powers of workers representativeness in the enterprise. But this process  requires  to be  sustained by social actors- i.e. “by a self reflection” of the  agents operating inside the firm  of which  workers representatives  are an important element  and by  external actors (mention is made of NGOs,  of social movements,  and also of legal initiatives like the  class action).  


12. Participation in the corporation  as “commons” 

 The necessary revision  of participatory  practices   and strategies   may receive new impulse  and broader  perspective  if  confronted  with  a recent reconceptualization  of the corporations “as commons”. According to this position  the theory of commons,  originally developed with  respect to natural  resources, better decribes  the legal structure  of business  enterprise that does  the shareholder primacy  model. The firms  is to be seen as a shared  resource  whose  sustainability depends  on the participation of multiple  constituencies  in its  governance:  not just shareholders but  employees, consumers and  core suppliers. 

Viewing the corporation  as a collectively managed  resource  by many  stakeholders  helps to understand  the conditions  on which  the different  actors  can contribute  both to the short  term  efficiency  but  also to long term  sustainable development. Even more  widely  it can  emphasize the  role of business  enterprise  in generating  the conditions for social and environmental  sustainability. 

The growing interest  in corporate social responsibility (CSR) reflects  the  recognition  that shareholder  value model does not necessarily  address  social  and environmental needs. The concept of sustainability, which  involves generating  value for stakeholders  instead  of just shareholders, is an alternative  orienting  principle  which  builds on the older concept of the  company  as a community of  interest  and  connects it with  wider  concerns with  the interests of society and of  the  environment as a whole.

It is true that institutional  board level workers participation has ben originally based on the concept of the enterprise as a community. But  the configuration of firm as commons has important difference with  that hystoric precedent: both the German idea of community and the communitarian vision of Japanese firms.  They both  refuse the  shareholders  primacy model. But the model  of the German tradition is historically linked to the governance structure of the large fordist enterprises.  The communitarian principle  which  support  the participation of workers does not  necessarily  alter the hyerarchical structure of the company, indeed it integrates   workers representatives in the governing bodies of the corporation  without changing their  functioning. It may submit some workplace decisions to  the controlling  powers of the works councils, but without changing  the primacy of the  managers  in the decision – making process and  the control powers of the  shareholders.

Consequently  the scope and the  actors of participation tend to coincide  with  the closed  circuit of the corporation. Whereas the idea  of commons  describes the sphere  of the  business enterprise as being open to the influence of various stakeholders  provided  with  different  rights and claims.  

European documents have stated  since the  early years  of the Community  that  legally  supported   employee  participation  is an  expression  of socially responsible management. The participation   of stakeholders, in particular of workers, is needed to include a voice for long term interests  in the company decision making process and to counterbalance the short- term interests of shareholders.  

The argument, supported by (some) empirical evidence is that worker involvement can help create a win-win situation in which  workers enjoy strong rights and the company  operates efficiently  in a  sustainable manner. 

A similar concept   of “sustainable company”  has  been  recently  analyzed  and proposed also  by the European  trade unions.   This indeed  is the  central meaning  of corporate  social  responsibility: that the  essential  values  of the firm  must  be  promoted  not only by management but  by all the stakeholders  in their  respective positions, included  specifically the employees  through their collective voice. This  perspective  has significant implications  in the relations between  workers  representatives and other stakeholders. 

A supportive  legal framework is envisaged by the European  unions in order to extend  the sustainable model of  companies  beyond a few  isolated cases. It is  recognized that many aspects  of the multidimensional concept of sustainability stretch beyond the traditional  concerns of trade unions. In this respect  the sustainable  company presents a challenge to the  unions capacity to take position  on  these issues and to  advise works councils representatives  at a  decentralized level. For this reason a supportive legislation should not only introduce  changes in various aspects of  capital  market  regulation, but also provide an extended  role for trade unions including expert capabilities  on sustainability  and on working with other stakeholders (e.g. NGOs)

In the  open forum of the enterprise as commons, workers representatives may have to compete with the voice  and claims of other stakeholders, particularly when workers  interests  overlap  or do not coincide  with  those of other wider  interests which are considered, as it is implied  in the idea   of the corporation  as commons. The recent  history  of advanced  economics present  quite a few cases in which the positions of  workers representatives go against  the interests of   wider communities, in particular the objective to keep a safe environment  and to  promote a substainable  development.    These conflicts  of interest, are different  from  those which  have  traditionally  been  settled by trade unions  and by workers representatives vis a vis the employers.

The need  to face  these new conflicts is acknowledged by those enterpreneurs who have adopted effective strategies and not simply  generic formulas of social  responsibility. 

This is a further  factor which requires  a revision of workers participation  at least in two  directions.  The contents and objective of workers  representation  will have  to be  refraimed  so as  to include  the consideration  of a wider  range  of interests. Workers representatives  will be challenged to be more selective  in pursing their objectives and even to abandon  traditional claims.

New channels  of communication  will have to be  opened with  the various constituencies  in view of building common  strategies not only on traditional  labor issues, but also on  matters  of general interest.  

Most European  unions have  expanded in the past  their action  beyond the  strict economic and normative  contents  of the  employment  contract and have sustained programs of social and economic reforms.  But the collective  action for social reforms was predominantly supported by the labor movement  and reflected its priorities. The variety  of stakeholders  which must  be considered   by a socially  responsible enterprise  have a different  and wider  social  agenda. The workers representatives  in the firms  will have to interact  with  these stakeholders on new grounds and with new proposals. This  diversified social interaction  will contribute  to  enrich the objectives and the strategies  of all kinds of participation. Moreover  it will  better  equip  workers representatives against  the risk of being  “captured” by  the logic  of management  and of pursusing corporatist short- term objectives.

Precisely to avoid  these risks the European labor movement has always  held that workers  participation  in the enterprise should  not  be practiced in isolation and  be limited  to micro issues.  Instead participation  in specific aspects  of firm’s  organization  should  be combined   with  participation  concerning  the  overall strategies of the companies. Moreover firm level  workers involvement has to be  connected  with broader  collective  action  and objectives of the labor unions.

The growing  pressures  toward the  decentralization  of labor relations  are increasing  the risks  of micro corporatist  drifts  particularly for these  workers  representatives  who are  directly  involved  with  management  in consultation  and participation within the firm. 

Opening the practices of participation  to new horizons and to the  influence of other social actors might  be  useful to reinforce workers  representatives at plant level,  more than any attempt at recentralizing industrial relations  from the top, by   national unions  initiatives and  political appeals.

The long history and the diversified experiences  of participation have contributed, particularly  in the European countries,  to consolidate  it as an essential form of workers  voice in the firms and as  a fundamental  component  of the social  model. The  capacity of workers participation to adjourn its goals and instruments will be quite important  for the  future of the labor movement and of the social model. 



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