The German model and its foundations Summary: The paper discusses the different forms of workers' participation in the firm in European countries.
1. Divergent national patterns and European harmonization
The concept and the practice of workers participation in the enterprise have a long and controversial history in the European countries. Indeed the basic ideas and ideologies have been a matter of discussion and of bitter controversies within the labor movement throughtout the XX Century. These controversies reflect the different position of the labor movement and of the (labour friendly) political parties on the role of workers and of trade unions in democratic countries.
Different unions and political strategies have shaped all the relations between the labor movement and the economic and social institutions of the European countries. The divergence among the various strategies has been most acute on the role of workers and unions vis a vis the central economic institution of our societies, namely the firm in its various forms, and has influenced the major traits of the national systems of labor management relations.
The role of workers and of unions representatives within the firms, in particular the forms and the possibility of their participation to enterprise decision-making, have been considered a significant element which characterizes the social model and indeed the different types of (national) capitalism.
The difference between the various European system, and their collectives actors, is well represented in the long dispute, which lasted for over two decades, concerning the European directives aimed at promoting different forms of workers participation in the enterprise.
The directives approved between 1985 and 2009 on this issue represent the major attempt of the European institution to intervene directly in labor management relations; and are an exception to the mainly abstensionistic attitude of the European Union in this area.
This intensive regulatory action confirms the importance attributed by the EU to the internal dynamics of the firms and to the promotion of collaboratory labor relations as essential components of the European social model. More specifically it is assumed that collaborative industrial relations at firm level are conducive to both social peace and economic efficiency. Moreover the promotion of social peace and collaboration within the firms is considered to contribute positively to radiate similar participatory attitudes and strategies to the entire system of industrial relations and hence to reinforce social cohesion and economic stability.
These reasons asserted by the European institutions during the preparation of the directives, were influenced by the most prominent model of workers participation at firm level, namely the German codetermination. But precisely on this point the European strategy had to face quite different positions not only of most national employers association, which are traditionally opposed or skeptical to all kind of workers participation, but also the reluctance of many national labor unions to adopt the German model of participation. The resistance was common to those unions which were not opposed in principle to workers participation, like the non communist unions of Italy, France, Spain and even UK.
This opposition was consistent with the practices of labor management relations prevailing in these countries. Their national unions, which traditionally regarded collective bargaining as the primary way to govern labor management in general and at firm level, attributed to collective agreements, and not to the law, the decision to set up and to regulate workers information and participation, and shared different positions on the content and on the forms of these rights.
2. The continuum of workers participation: from information to board- level representation
The different forms of participation adopted in the national systems can be placed along a continuum, ranging from the right of workers and of their representatives to be informed about the major decisions of the enterprise, to that of beeing consulted on the same issues prior to employers decisions, to the various forms of “institutional” participation, including the presence of workers representatives in the governing bodies of the company. The definition of these participatory rights as a continuum indicates that they share common elements and differ for the modes and the intensity of their influence on enterprise decision making.
But the two poles of the continuum represent different policy and ideological approaches of the unions vis a vis the firm, a divergence linked to the general positions of the labor movement in industrial relations and in society. At one extreme the basic concept is that the unions and the forms of workers participation have to be remain external to the firm, and the influence on firms decisions can be exerted through the various forms of collective action, including strike.
This position excludes the presence of employees representatives not only in the decision making process of the enterprise, but in principle also in bilateral institutions set up within the enterprise with the task of determining working conditions in conjunction with management.
A similar approach has inspired the general attitude of the these Unions towards the private enterprise and indeed towards the functioning of the economy. Unions actions and collective bargaining had to be concerned exclusively with the representation and protection of workers interests mainly in the distribution of income, with no concern with the organization, the strategies and even the success of the firm.
These positions have deep roots in the political and labor union history of these countries. They are favoured by a system of industrial relations characterized by high level of political and ideological conflict and class consciousness of the labor movement, by the existence of strong leftwing parties, particularly the communist, and by the traditional weakness of organized labor which has kept it away from the enterprise, and excluded the possibility of influencing from within the managerial decision making process.
Similar “antagonistic” orientations were not confined to the most militant labor unions, but reflected the widely shared opinion that growth was a self-sustaining mechanism, in a linear direction of development. This opinion implied that labor law and at social policies in most countries, had the exclusive objective to protect workers in their employment conditions.
The profound transformations intervened in the last decades with the recurrent economic crisis and instability, have altered the very basis on which these assumptions were founded. These transformations have challenged the economic actors to change attitude and forced them to share the concern for the conditions of production and for the dynamics of the firms. For much the same reasons labor law is required to change its approach with respect to the economic conditions of growth. We will return of this point.
3. The German model and its foundations
The other extreme of the continuum is represented by the “institutional” or organic forms of workers participation, in which workers representatives are present in the governing bodies of the firms, more precisely of their legal expression, the corporation. Here too the development of these forms of institutional participation is rooted in the history of the political and industrial relations systems. These systems, which are mainly concentrated in central and northern European countries, are characterized by a strong, united and politically integrated union movement, by a stable social and political structure of the country, by a civic attitude and ethos inclined to sustain social cohesion. All these elements are conducive to develop and to make acceptable non adversarial labor management relations. More specifically they are reinforced by a widely shared concept of the firm as an organic entity or as a community (gemeinschaft), which corresponds to the common feeling of the people and has been dominant also among the legal scholars. In fact this communitarian concept of the firm is most congenial for hosting some institutional or organic forms of participation of workers who are a decisive component of the enterprise community.
These favourable conditions have not removed all the obstacles to the introduction of the various forms of institutional participation in those countries. The difficulties are shown in the first experiments and in the subsequent events of the Weimar Republic, and after the second world by the introduction of Mitbestimmung in Germany by decree of the allied forces occupying the country.
These forms of workers participation have been introduced in the governance structure of the companies as existing at the time, without questioning its form and legitimacy. This decision, appears to be consistent with the idea of the firm as “Gemeinschaft”, in so far as the workers representatives are an integral part of the community as it is. In fact this assumption has not been challenged in the subsequent experience of the Mitbestimmung. As we shall see it will have to be reexamined in view of the transformations of the companies structure in the postfordist era.
One further element must be mentioned in order to qualify the forms of institutional participation adopted in central European countries: namely the presence of workers rappresentative elected in the units of the firm having codetermination rights in a series of important enterprise decisions. These powers of codetermination legally recognized are an essential part of the participatory model of German companies. They do not alter the hierarchical structure of firms but they shape their decision processes not by periodical pressures like in collective bargaining but by their presence and daily intervention in the work organization and practices.
4. European harmonization of a minimum common denominator
The various system of participation have developed in the European countries according to the national traditions and responding to the strategies of the national actors: the social parties, the governments and the relevant public institutions.
For this reason the original purpose of the European authorities to harmonize the national models of participation has met with strong obstacles. In fact the European Commission has promoted successifully the harmonization only of those forms of participation which were present and accepted in most European countries: first of all information and consultation, subsequently the European Works Councils (EWC), which are mainly instrumental to the practice of information and consultation rights.
The EU directives on these issues have managed to harmonize some common traits of national practices, i. e. adopting and extending a sort of minimum common denominator. This result and these limits of the European harmonization are indeed common to other areas of European social law.
The unions and the EWCs have been granted the rights to previous information and consultation on the major firms initiatives and policies, but not the rights to codetermination, which have the most direct influence on the decision making process of the firms. The EU promotion of the rights of information and consultation had a direct impact in these countries whose national practices had never experienced statutory regulation of the matter. In other countries, like Italy, where information and consultation rights were recognized by many national agreements, the European directives 94/45 and 2002/14 contributed to consolidate and to extend the existing practices. An important impact of these directives is that they have contributed to spread these practices among small and medium size firms which usually were not reached by collective agreements.
The scope of directive 2002/149 covers all European firms employing more than 50 employees in one member country; which means a coverage of 3% of firms and of 50% of the employees. Lower limits are sometime indicated in national systems, following the impulse of legislation and of unions pressure.
The impact of these directives on the actual practice of information and consultation has been uneven, depending not so much on the legal transposition of the European norms in the national legislations, but on trade unions influence in the workplaces and on the general conditions of national industrial relations.
The European directive 94/45 (revised by directive 2009/38) has been rather effective in promoting the diffusion of EWCS among firms operating in different European states. According to recent estimates EWCs have been set up in 1071 firms and groups of enterprises, amounting to a considerable percentage of the large companies operating in Europe (employing over 17 million workers). These representative bodies have contributed to improve the effectiveness of information and consultation practices with regard to transnational issues.
Moreover the EWC have developed their functions often beyond the area indicated by the directive, because they tend the use their rights to information and consultation in order to behave informally as bargaining agents, making the most of their acquised knowledge of firms decisions and strategies.
As mentioned already the directives on EWCs and information and consultation rights have promoted the type of participation more in line with the tradition of Industrial Relation of many European countries, and less resisted by both the unions and the employers associations precisely because these rights are asserted from “outside” the firm. However the diffusion of information and consultation rights and of the representative bodies excercising these rights has contributed considerably to introduce participatory patterns in European labor management relations, and to influence in the same direction the practices of collective bargaining.
The collective rights of informations and consultation recognized by the directives concern the firms decisions not only on work organization and on the conditions of work, but also on the employment trends and on the major decisions and development plans impinging on employment and working conditions. The periodic exchange of information and of opinions between the parties on these issues has provided workers representatives with a systematic knowledge of the enterprise functioning and strategies, which is absent or even excluded in adversarial collective bargaining.
The norms of the directive provide that information and consultation must intervene in due time, i.e. since the initial formation of enterprise decisions, so to allow an effective dialogue between the parties and an influence on the final decisions of the firm: then norms are an explicit indication that these firms decisions must take into account the collective voice of the employees. The other provision of the directives whereby the rights to information and consultation must be exercised vis a vis “the appropriate level of the enterprise decision making process”, gives the workers representative an unprecedented opportunity to look into the structure of the enterprises and to verify the relevant centers of decision even beyond the “legal veils” of the different companies which are part of the group.
The diffusion and the acceptance of the rights of information and consultation mark a substantial distance from the positions traditionally followed by some national unions which excluded any involvement in the enterprise. These rights, although asserted “from outside” may be quite influencial on enterprise behaviour.
This argument may be used and in fact is often advanced, to confirm the view that the various forms of participation should be analyzed on a continuum and judged for their effective incidence on firms decisions more than for their legal form.
4. The compromise solution of the SE
The different positions of the actors of the national industrial relations systems are reflected in the long discussions which have brought to the approval of the European company statute in 2001 (directive 2001/86 and regulation 2157/2001). The final approval was based on a compromise among the different positions which had blocked the decision for years. The initial proposal to adopt the German system of board level employees representation as the only model for the SE, was abandoned. Instead the European company was shaped as to allow other forms of employees participation practiced in the European countries: not only the presence of employees representatives in the governing bodies of the companies (board of directors; supervisory board), but also the election of workers representatives in a special body, distinct from those organs and enabled to exercise the rights to information and consultation.
The option between these different models was left in first instance to the parties negotiating the adoption of the SE (special negotiating body), according to the subsidiarity principle followed in other areas of European social policies. Lacking any agreement among the parties the directive indicates as subsidiary requirements two possible solutions: the adoption of a form of organic participation if preexisting in the companies present in the SE or of a representative body distinct from the organs of the enterprise. This provision, based on the before/after principle implies that the rights of participation acquired in the original company are the basis for the same rights in the SE. More specifically it is intended to avoid that the adoption of the SE might reduce the rights of the employees of the countries where the institutional participation of workers in the companies was previously established.
The plurality of forms allowed by the directive and the conservation of previous employees rights indicates the impossibility to fully harmonize the different systems present in the European countries. In particular it confirms the reluctance of the social parties of many countries, although for different reasons, to break with their national traditions and to accept a direct involvement in the governance structure of the firms.
On the other hand the directive recognizes to the representative bodies of the workers in the SE the same rights to information, consultation and participation which are granted to the trade unions and to the EWCs by the directives 2002/149 and 2009/38.
This latter solution can hardly by considered equivalent to the organic participation typical of the German model, because the presence of workers participation within the boards of the firm allows for a more stable and more significant exchange of information and of opinions between the boards and workers representatives. It may also facilitate greater workers influence on the decisions of the bodies where their representatives are present: the board of directors (vorstand) or the supervisory board (aufsichtrat).
5. Factors affecting the effectiveness of participation
In any case however the influence of workers representatives on company’s decisions is limited because they are in a minority position within the boards, and even in the most advanced form of participation they can never determine the final decision of the board (see M. Weiss, in this volume).
The effective influence may depend on factors others than the legal composition of the boards, namely on the capacity of workers representatives to support their view with the authority derived from the pressure of their constituencies and possibly on the ability to establish alliances with other stakeholders, internal and external to the firm. Moreover the structure of the decision -making process and the distribution of competences among the various organs of the firm, even beyond the legal provisions, is relevant in determining the real impact of workers participation on the company strategy and organization.
The effectiveness of workers representation is also linked to the specific objects of firm decisions. The practice of participation indicates that workers representatives in the boards (and also the Work Directors provided by the German legislation of 1976 and 1951) usually concentrate their attention on those decisions which are directly relevant to working conditions. This represent a sort of tacit division of labor with the representatives of management which correspond to the skills and the traditional roles of workers and of managers in any type of company. Given this division of labor, the position of workers representatives in the institutional participation may resemble to that of unions representatives and of the EWCs in a well functioning system of information and consultation in participatory bargaining.
Moreover informal arrangements are often adopted by companies in order to specify or to circumvent formal procedures, and to change the functions of the organs where workers representatives are present, with the effect of reducing their voice and influence. Indeed, as indicated by M. Weiss with reference to the Germany model, the actual value of institutional participation can be fully appreciated only by taking into account the entire system of labor management relations; particularly the presence of two levels of workers representation closely interrelated, where the workers representation in the supervisory board is a sort of extended arm of the works councils. Most employees representatives in the board are usually also works council members and this link has strengthened both those instruments of participation. It has promoted communication through informal channels, between workers representatives and their constituencies contributing to build mutual trust and an organizational culture based on long lasting consultation practices. The success of the German model is grounded on these factors, and even more profoundly in common social values, including the idea of the firm a community: all elements which are not easily transferable in other national systems.
The impact of directive 86/2001 on the harmonization of participatory practices in Europe has been rather limited. The number of SE has increased to around 600, but mainly in the countries of central Europe where large companies had already adopted forms of organic participation and wanted to maintain them in the new European format.
In the other European countries the parties have continued to practice the forms of participation traditionally prevailing, and have avoided to adopt the SE even in the minimal version (subsidiary requirements) endorsed by the directive in case of non agreement among the negotiating parties which does not innovate the traditional practices of information and consultation.
The practice of these countries confirms the reluctance of both social parties, (although for different reasons) to cross the “borders” of the company structure of governance. The unions are still opposed to be involved in the internal functioning of the enterprise, because they consider it an alien if not an hostile ground. The employers prefer to keep workers representatives off this ground; indeed in the case of SME they tend to exclude the very presence of these representatives.
6. The impact of the recent transformations of work and of firms structure on workers participation
The great transformations occurred in recent years in the economic and social conditions of the world and in the structure of firms have exposed to new challenges all the components of industrial relations systems including the forms and practices of participation.
An extensive body of research has analyzed the economic and social changes which have altered the traditional traits of Industrial relations and the power relations between the actors to the detriment of the labor movement. The impact of the new forms of organization of the firms, national and multinational, has also been analyzed, but not yet fully explored.
The diversity and the increased volatility of the types of work induced by the new technologies, the competitive pressures, and the deregulation of markets have contributed to a general weakening of the labor movement, eroding the very basis of their representativeness and of collective action. These factors have a negative impact particularly on workers representative bodies in the workplace which are essential actors of collective action and are directly exposed to the pressure of these factors. The diversity of the new workforce has reduced its social cohesion and contributed to create favourable conditions for the individualization of labor management relations. It has reduced the appeal of all forms of collective action for the new workers and at the same time has made room for an innovative management to establish direct relations with the individual employees and/or groups of them with the aim of promoting their involvement in the enterprise.
The term “involvement” has multiple connotations, but in these cases it implies that the participation of employees is shaped individually on management terms and is determined by management more strictly than those forms of participation based on collective or legal regulations.
7. Management- led forms of employees involvement
The forms and objects of these managerial initiatives are different. But they share a common character, that of being mostly concerned with the organization of work in the productive units, or even below, in the shop floor.
The involvement of employees as individuals and in team works, which are often being used particularly in the sectors of intelligent manufacturing, has proved to be an effective instrument for promoting innovations and productivity. Participatory teams are highly valued by management because they allow to make the most of the experience and of the knowledge of the employees acquired in the daily life of the plants.
Recent research, concerned mainly with Italian cases, shows ambivalent implications of this type of involvement for labor management and industrial relation. It confirms that employees involvement in participatory teams is gaining ground among high performance firms where it contributes to the firms success and to the well being of the people involved. The initiation and the contents of these experiments are always in the hands of management. But their objective is not necessary anti union, as it has been historically in many countries (US in the first place). Most often management initiatives seem to develop outside union channels, without any formal unions intervention, particularly in the countries where they have no legal power to intervene in work organization. Union representatives particularly at plant level have been involved and contributed to their success in specific cases where the practice of collaborative labor relations was already established.
The success of these experiments confirms their importance for the quality of future labor management relations. The labor unions are called to respond to this new challenge on penalty of leaving to management an important ground of action which may enrich the value of participation, particularly for employees who are not reached by traditional collective activities.
It is up to the unions to place these forms of “micro participation” in the wider context of labor management relations, so that the scope and influence of collective participation may be extended to all business activities and strategies, as it has been in the most valuable national traditions.
8. Specialized and financial forms of workers participation
European firms have experienced in many countries other forms of employees participation. A widely diffused type is represented by specialized representative bodies, often bilateral, dealing with matters of common interest of the parties directly influencial on the quality of work.
The majors areas of interest are professional training, health and safety at work and welfare benefits. The EU has not provided any general model of specialized workers representation.
Health and safety at work has been an area of extensive regulation by the European authorities. The council directive of June 12, 1989 recognizes the rights of employees and /or of their representatives to be consulted and to take part in all issues relating to health and safety at work. A similar right is sanctioned by many national legislations which regulate also various forms of specialized committees competent in these matters.
It is also worth noting that the European Union has recognized the opportunity to adopt various forms of workers participation to the economic results of the firm, in two directions: by promoting various kinds of bonuses and profit sharing and by favouring with fiscal incentives the distribution of shares among employees and employees stock ownership plans (ESOP).
These types of participation have in common with other forms character that they may contribute to promote employees involvement within the enterprise, but they differ from the mainstream approach of workers participation for their sectorial or micro objects which reduces or exclude their impact on the overall balance of labor management relations.
For this reason they have usually attracted scarce interest or met with resistance from the labor movement; and in many cases have been promoted by managerial initiatives. On the other hand they have acquired greater importance also for the labor movement when, like in the field of health and safety and of professional training, they have been endorsed by legislation or when some forms of financial participation such as profit sharing and stock ownership have not remained a simply way of remunerating the work, but have implied some participation of workers to the governance of the firm. This has been the case e.g. in some Italian and French state controlled enterprises.
9. Acceptance and innovation of workers participation: the impact of the individualization of employment relations
The forms of workers participation analyzed so far have come to be widely, if not unanimously, accepted in many European countries. But their long experience does not rescue them from the challenges deriving from the new environment in which they must operate, which is so different from that of their origins. On the contrary this acceptance might favour inertia or even prize conservation over innovation.
The major challenges to employees participation come from two factors, which are affecting all aspects of social and economic life: the diversity and the individualization of the working population; the changing structure and organization of the firms.
As I have already mentioned, the former trend poses a major threat to the very basis on which industrial relations and labor law have been built. How to relaunch the spirit and the strategies of collective action is an open question decisive for the future of the labor movement. The diffusion of workers participation at the enterprise and workshop level, may contribute to revitalizing the unions initiatives. This contribution may be more significant than that of adversarial collective bargaining which in the present contest of economic turmoil may be less attractive to the new labor force and possibly detrimental to the pursuance of common obiectives of economic growth.
The importance of micro participation can increase if the legislator, as it has done in Germany will reinforce the presence of workers representative providing them with significant and even binding powers on the major issues of work organization. It remains to be seen if and under which conditions workers participation may keep this positive influence when it has to deal not with micro issues but with the general strategies of the firms and even more so with the directions and quality of economic growth; because these issues are less easily perceivable by the individualized constituencies of the unions.
The second major trend of our time, i.e. the new forms of organization and of governance of the firm, have wide ranging implications on our social and economic systems and specifically on labor management relations. These implications are only partially explored by the actors of labor relations; because both the theoretical analysis and the pratical consequences of the transformation of the firm (and of its legal form the corporation) have been for a long time neglected. Their impact has not been fully explored not only by unions representatives, but also by scholars, due to the traditional separation between the approach of labor lawyers and of business lawyers. The same separation is present in the two European legal sources, which have regulated the matter: a regulation on the statute of SE and a directive on workers participation in the SE. More specific research should be directed to analyze carefully, also on the basis of the existing practices, particularly these issues: how the functions and the structure of the various governing bodies of the firm influence the behavior of the workers representatives, the interaction of these representatives with their constituency and with the representatives of management and of property; the distribution of roles, formal and informal, in respect to the different firm activities.
10. The impact of changing enterprise structures: group enterprises and “network contracts”
This neglect seems to be a residual manifestation of the traditional idea that the firm is not a matter of concern for the labor movement, but an entity to be taken as given and possibly to be changed by external action pressure.
Indeed one aspect of the enterprise transformation, namely the group of enterprises, has attacted more attention than others by the legal doctrine and also by many national legislators. The aim has been mainly that of extending the area of labor law protections to the whole perimeter of the enterprise group and vis a vis the group itself. These attempts of the legal doctrine and of the national judges have not always been successful to break the “corporate veil” and to identify the group as an entity responsible for labor law obligations. The identity and the responsibility of the enterprise group have been affirmed on various ground only for specific issues, including the exercise of workers rights of information, consultation and participation.
The European Union has pursued since the 80ies the objective of “forcing” the center of decision of the enterprise group with the aim of providing workers representatives with the relevant information concerning the whole group; in the Vredeling proposal even when this center of decision was located outside the European community.
Directives 2002/4 and 2009/38 confirm the same purpose by providing that the rights of workers representatives to consultation and information, must be exercised vis a vis the appropriate level of decision making. The EWC directive (art. 3) has also given an extensive definition of the controlling undertaking, in order to establish the body responsible for many duties of informations and consultation.
Similarly the norms on the institutional forms of participation take into account the specific character of the enterprise group, usually by providing that workers representatives must be present in the boards of the dominant firm of the group. The national and European regulation seem to indicate that the law is inclined to take into account the real power relations within the companies and the groups even beyond their legal structure. This factual approach is more easily followed here than in traditional employment regulation.
Such an approach seems in line with the need that these collective rights be measured precisely on their capacity to influence the power relations among the social parties. Complex problems of interpretation remain to be solved, particularly in order to identify the boundaries of the group of enterprises and the real center of decisions among different legal entities. In fact the conclusion reached on this question by national and European courts are far from convergent.
Moreover the criteria adopted to solve this problem with respect to enterprise groups are not easily applicable to other forms of aggregation between firms, like the so called “network contracts” where no dominant center of power is identifiable because the units of the network are linked by contractual relations established through consensus among peers. The practice of network contracts, is becoming less an exception, indeed quite common, as modern firms move away from the hierarchical structure of governance developed in the fordist model of production.
In fact the transformations of modern business enterprise have general implications for the legal theories of the firm and have spurred the legal doctrine to reconceptualize the economic theorization of corporate law and of corporate governance.
11. Participation in the “fluid enterprise”
The revision is underway with interesting but still uncertain results, some of which are presented in this volume.
Contributions to this debate are coming from the field of legal theory and of corporation law more than from labor lawyers for the reasons indicated above. For the same reason the law and the practice of industrial relations have been predominantly interested in the firm as productive unit and have discregarded the importance of its governance structure. But the new configuration of the network firm and the theories which represent the enterprise as a more or less defined combination of contracts, have major consequences on both collective and individual employment relations because they blur the identity of the subject employer who is the necessary counterpart of the employees in individual and collective relations. The new character of the firm as a “fluide sequence” of contract may require criteria for the identification of the employer different from those developed by traditional labor law.
The new criteria for this identification may be based on the major functions which underpins the notion of employer. It has been argued that the transformation of the firm’s structure and organization may modify and even abolish the traditional subjects, but not the major functions and roles of business enterprises. In the specific case of “networks contracts” involving multiple units and firms, the definition of the various functions will depend in the first place on the contract which defines the powers and responsabilities of the parties, including those concerning employment relations. But the conditions for establishing these responsabilities will follow in principle the general rules of civil law. To avoid abuses the various types of responsibility will be attributed to the subjects who have exercised the functions of employer even beyond the wording of the contract.
These mutations of the firm structure have different implications on the forms of workers participation. Board level participation has been based on the pattern of the large fordist corporation and on the notion of the enterprise as community. This form of participation may continue to operate as long as this type of enterprise exists. Its factual influence on labor management relations will depend on the importance that large corporations continue to have in the future systems of production. The various forms of sub contracting, outsourcing and fragmentation of productive activities will tend to reduce the scope of this type of participation. In any event workers institutional participation might have to adopt new instruments in order to function within the host corporation, which itself will be influenced by the changed economic and social scenario. For this reason the existing patterns of governance where workers representatives are elected cannot any long taken for granted as it has been so far. The very legal notion of establishement and of employees relevant to the application of workers participation might have to be redefined in view of the changing forms of organization of work and of the enterprise.
Other patterns of participatory rights - mainly information and consultation - which have developed in Europe are less dependent on the structure of the enterprise. But even these rights have been mainly exercised - like most other collective rights – vis a vis the large enterprises and group enterprises assuming their existing governance and centers of decision.
The emergence of network firms and of multifunctional employers will require profound adaptation also of these forms of participation if they want to maintain economic and social effectiveness. In these cases the risk for workers representatives is to run after the multiple functions of the firm, as it happens with the micro forms of participation mentioned above, and to be captured by the interests of management or at best to reflect the “partial rationalities” of the specific functions.
How to restore some unity of purpose among the various fragments of participation and finalize them, is an open question which must be faced with innovative answers by the collective actors in the first place and possibly by the legislator. A useful contribution could be to reinforce by law the powers of workers representatives at shop- floor level, which remains a decisive area of influence also in the new contest of multifunctional firms.
A second important condition is to strenghten the organizational and political links between shop floor representatives and the other levels of unions organization present in the enterprise and beyond. This condition must be fulfilled by the labor movement itself and presupposes a search for unity beyond the boundaries of the individual firm. The pursuance of a unitary collective voice is the most important answer that the labor unions can oppose to the fragmentation of the employer. Indeed this is a general challenge facing the labor movement in the advanced economies; which implies not only a revision of strategies by the labor movement itself but also a reconsideration of the role of the law vis a vis the firm’s governance.
This issue can only be mentioned here because it has to be framed in the much broarder perspective of the horizontal effects of fundamental rights and of the scope of “constitutionalism beyond the state”. The implications of this “societal constitutionalism” on the new forms of firms governance should be explored following the suggestions of the authors who stress the importance of “capillary constitutions” to counteract the “totalization tendencies or the partial rationalites of the social subsystems” and of the multiple centers of powers present in our society. It has to be remembered that the various forms of workers participation were among the forerunners of this idea of societal constitutionalism. Giving new instruments and strategies to workers participation in the enterprise will contribute to the expansion of constitutionalism in a critical area of social relations.
The impulse in this direction may come from an interplay of two process: of legal interventions and of the influence of social structures. The law can contribute to strenghten the autonomy and the powers of workers representativeness in the enterprise. But this process requires to be sustained by social actors- i.e. “by a self reflection” of the agents operating inside the firm of which workers representatives are an important element and by external actors (mention is made of NGOs, of social movements, and also of legal initiatives like the class action).
12. Participation in the corporation as “commons”
The necessary revision of participatory practices and strategies may receive new impulse and broader perspective if confronted with a recent reconceptualization of the corporations “as commons”. According to this position the theory of commons, originally developed with respect to natural resources, better decribes the legal structure of business enterprise that does the shareholder primacy model. The firms is to be seen as a shared resource whose sustainability depends on the participation of multiple constituencies in its governance: not just shareholders but employees, consumers and core suppliers.
Viewing the corporation as a collectively managed resource by many stakeholders helps to understand the conditions on which the different actors can contribute both to the short term efficiency but also to long term sustainable development. Even more widely it can emphasize the role of business enterprise in generating the conditions for social and environmental sustainability.
The growing interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) reflects the recognition that shareholder value model does not necessarily address social and environmental needs. The concept of sustainability, which involves generating value for stakeholders instead of just shareholders, is an alternative orienting principle which builds on the older concept of the company as a community of interest and connects it with wider concerns with the interests of society and of the environment as a whole.
It is true that institutional board level workers participation has ben originally based on the concept of the enterprise as a community. But the configuration of firm as commons has important difference with that hystoric precedent: both the German idea of community and the communitarian vision of Japanese firms. They both refuse the shareholders primacy model. But the model of the German tradition is historically linked to the governance structure of the large fordist enterprises. The communitarian principle which support the participation of workers does not necessarily alter the hyerarchical structure of the company, indeed it integrates workers representatives in the governing bodies of the corporation without changing their functioning. It may submit some workplace decisions to the controlling powers of the works councils, but without changing the primacy of the managers in the decision – making process and the control powers of the shareholders.
Consequently the scope and the actors of participation tend to coincide with the closed circuit of the corporation. Whereas the idea of commons describes the sphere of the business enterprise as being open to the influence of various stakeholders provided with different rights and claims.
European documents have stated since the early years of the Community that legally supported employee participation is an expression of socially responsible management. The participation of stakeholders, in particular of workers, is needed to include a voice for long term interests in the company decision making process and to counterbalance the short- term interests of shareholders.
The argument, supported by (some) empirical evidence is that worker involvement can help create a win-win situation in which workers enjoy strong rights and the company operates efficiently in a sustainable manner.
A similar concept of “sustainable company” has been recently analyzed and proposed also by the European trade unions. This indeed is the central meaning of corporate social responsibility: that the essential values of the firm must be promoted not only by management but by all the stakeholders in their respective positions, included specifically the employees through their collective voice. This perspective has significant implications in the relations between workers representatives and other stakeholders.
A supportive legal framework is envisaged by the European unions in order to extend the sustainable model of companies beyond a few isolated cases. It is recognized that many aspects of the multidimensional concept of sustainability stretch beyond the traditional concerns of trade unions. In this respect the sustainable company presents a challenge to the unions capacity to take position on these issues and to advise works councils representatives at a decentralized level. For this reason a supportive legislation should not only introduce changes in various aspects of capital market regulation, but also provide an extended role for trade unions including expert capabilities on sustainability and on working with other stakeholders (e.g. NGOs)
In the open forum of the enterprise as commons, workers representatives may have to compete with the voice and claims of other stakeholders, particularly when workers interests overlap or do not coincide with those of other wider interests which are considered, as it is implied in the idea of the corporation as commons. The recent history of advanced economics present quite a few cases in which the positions of workers representatives go against the interests of wider communities, in particular the objective to keep a safe environment and to promote a substainable development. These conflicts of interest, are different from those which have traditionally been settled by trade unions and by workers representatives vis a vis the employers.
The need to face these new conflicts is acknowledged by those enterpreneurs who have adopted effective strategies and not simply generic formulas of social responsibility.
This is a further factor which requires a revision of workers participation at least in two directions. The contents and objective of workers representation will have to be refraimed so as to include the consideration of a wider range of interests. Workers representatives will be challenged to be more selective in pursing their objectives and even to abandon traditional claims.
New channels of communication will have to be opened with the various constituencies in view of building common strategies not only on traditional labor issues, but also on matters of general interest.
Most European unions have expanded in the past their action beyond the strict economic and normative contents of the employment contract and have sustained programs of social and economic reforms. But the collective action for social reforms was predominantly supported by the labor movement and reflected its priorities. The variety of stakeholders which must be considered by a socially responsible enterprise have a different and wider social agenda. The workers representatives in the firms will have to interact with these stakeholders on new grounds and with new proposals. This diversified social interaction will contribute to enrich the objectives and the strategies of all kinds of participation. Moreover it will better equip workers representatives against the risk of being “captured” by the logic of management and of pursusing corporatist short- term objectives.
Precisely to avoid these risks the European labor movement has always held that workers participation in the enterprise should not be practiced in isolation and be limited to micro issues. Instead participation in specific aspects of firm’s organization should be combined with participation concerning the overall strategies of the companies. Moreover firm level workers involvement has to be connected with broader collective action and objectives of the labor unions.
The growing pressures toward the decentralization of labor relations are increasing the risks of micro corporatist drifts particularly for these workers representatives who are directly involved with management in consultation and participation within the firm.
Opening the practices of participation to new horizons and to the influence of other social actors might be useful to reinforce workers representatives at plant level, more than any attempt at recentralizing industrial relations from the top, by national unions initiatives and political appeals.
The long history and the diversified experiences of participation have contributed, particularly in the European countries, to consolidate it as an essential form of workers voice in the firms and as a fundamental component of the social model. The capacity of workers participation to adjourn its goals and instruments will be quite important for the future of the labor movement and of the social model.
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